Strategic Social Choice Stable Representations of Constitutions /

This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Peleg, Bezalel. (Author), Peters, Hans. (Author)
Corporate Author: SpringerLink (Online service)
Format: Electronic
Language:English
Published: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010.
Series:Studies in Choice and Welfare,
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ezaccess.library.uitm.edu.my/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13875-1
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505 0 # |a Preview of this book -- Representations of constitutions: Introduction to Part I; Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms; Nash consistent representations; Acceptable representations; Strongly consistent representations; Nash consistent representation through lottery models; On the continuity of representations of constitutions -- Consistent voting: Introduction to Part II; Feasible elimination procedures; Exactly and strongly consistent representations of effectivity functions; Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters. 
520 # # |a This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution. 
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650 2 4 |a Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences. 
650 2 4 |a Economic Theory. 
650 2 4 |a Methodology of the Social Sciences. 
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