Strategic Social Choice Stable Representations of Constitutions /

• Main Authors: Peleg, Bezalel. (Author), Peters, Hans. (Author)
• Corporate Author: SpringerLink (Online service)
• Format: Electronic
• Language: English
• Published: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010.
• Series: Studies in Choice and Welfare,
• Subjects: Economics.; Mathematics.; Economics, Mathematical.; Social sciences > Methodology.; Economics/Management Science.; Game Theory/Mathematical Methods.; Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences.; Economic Theory.; Methodology of the Social Sciences.
• Online Access: https://ezaccess.library.uitm.edu.my/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13875-1
• Physical Description: XVIII, 154 p. online resource.
• ISBN: 9783642138751
• ISSN: 1614-0311

This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution.