Collective Decision Making Views from Social Choice and Game Theory /
This book discusses collective decision making from the perspective of social choice and game theory. The chapters are written by well-known scholars in the field. The topics range from Arrows Theorem to the Condorcet and Ostrogorski Paradoxes, from vote distributions in the European Council to inf...
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| Other Authors: | , |
| Format: | Electronic |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Berlin, Heidelberg :
Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2010.
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| Series: | Theory and Decision Library C, Game Theory, Mathematical Programming and Operations Research,
43 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ezaccess.library.uitm.edu.my/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02865-6 |
Table of Contents:
- From Black's Advice and Arrow's Theorem to the Gibbard-Satterthewaite Result
- The Impact of Forcing Preferences Rankings when Indifference Exists
- Connections and Implications of the Ostrogorski Paradox for Spatial Voting Models
- Maximal Domain for Maskin Monotone Pareto Optimal and Anonymous Choice Rules
- Extremal Restriction, Condorcet Sets, and Majority Decision Making
- Rights Revisited, and Limited
- Some General Results on Responsibility for Outcomes
- Existence of a Dictatorial Subgropu in Social Choice with Independent Subgroup Utility Scales, an Alternative Proof
- Makint (Non-Standard) Choices
- Puzzles and Paradoxes Involving Averages
- Voting Weights, Thresholds and Population Size
- Stabilizing Power Sharing
- Different Approaches to Influence Based on Social Networks and Simple Games
- Networks, Information and Choice
- Characterizations of Bargaining Solutions by Properties of Their Status Quo Sets
- Monotonicity Properties of Interval Solutions and the Dutta-Ray-Solution for Convex Interval Games.