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|a 9789814374590 (electronic bk.)
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|a 629.8312
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|a Bergemann, Dirk.
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|a Robust mechanism design
|b the role of private information and higher order beliefs /
|c Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris.
|h [electronic resource] :
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|a Singapore ;
|a Hackensack, N.J. :
|b World Scientific Pub. Co.,
|c c2012.
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| 300 |
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|a xvii, 452 p. :
|b ill.
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|a World Scientific series in economic theory
|v v. 2
|x 2251-2071 ;
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|a Includes bibliographical references and index.
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|a Robust mechanism design: an introduction. 1. Introduction. 2. Leading example: allocating a private good with interdependent values. 3. Type spaces. 4. Robust foundations for dominant and ex post incentive compatibility. 5. Full implementation. 6. Open issues -- ch. 1. Robust mechanism design. 1. Introduction. 2. Setup. 3. Examples. 4. Separable environments. 5. The quasilinear environment with budget balance. 6. Discussion -- ch. 2. Ex post implementation. 1. Introduction. 2. Model. 3. Monotonicity. 4. Ex post implementation. 5. Single crossing environment. 6. Direct mechanisms. 7. Single unit auction. 8. Social choice sets. 9. Mixed strategy implementation. 10. Conclusion -- ch. 3. Robust implementation in direct mechanisms. 1. Introduction. 2. Setup. 3. A public good example. 4. Robust implementation. 5. Necessity of contraction property. 6. The linear model. 7. Single unit auction. 8. Discussion. 9. Appendix -- ch. 4. Robust implementation in general mechanisms. 1. Introduction. 2. Setup. 3. Finite mechanisms. 4. Rationalizable and robust implementation in infinite mechanisms. 5. Infinite mechanisms. 6. Extensions, variations and discussion. 7. Appendix -- ch. 5. The role of the common prior in robust implementation. 1. Introduction. 2. Setup. 3. A public good example. 4. Discussion -- ch. 6. An ascending auction for interdependent values: uniqueness and robustness to strategic uncertainty. 1. Model. 2. Static auction. 3. Dynamic auction. 4. Discussion. 5. Conclusion -- ch. 7. Robust virtual implementation. 1. Introduction. 2. Setting. 3. An environment with interdependent values for a single good. 4. Strategic distinguishability. 5. Robust virtual implementation. 6. Discussion. 7. Appendix -- ch. 8. Multidimensional private value auctions. 1. Introduction. 2. The model. 3. Seller's expected revenue. 4. Efficiency. 5. Equilibrium existence. 6. Discussion: revenue and information acquisition. 7. Conclusion -- ch. 9. The robustness of robust implementation. 1. Introduction. 2. Setup. 3. Baseline payoff environments. 4. Main result. 5. Discussion -- ch. 10. Rationalizable implementation. 1. Introduction. 2. Setup. 3. Main result. 4. The non-responsive case. 5. Concluding remarks -- ch. 11. Pricing without priors. 1. Introduction. 2. Model. 3. Pricing without priors. 4. Discussion -- ch. 12. Robust monopoly pricing. 1. Introduction. 2. Model. 3. Maximin utility. 4. Minimax regret. 5. Discussion.
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|a This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers. The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.
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| 533 |
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|a Electronic reproduction.
|b Singapore :
|c World Scientific Publishing Co.,
|d 2012.
|n System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
|n Mode of access: World Wide Web.
|n Available to subscribing institutions.
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|a Robust control.
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|a Prices.
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|a Electronic books.
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|a Morris, Stephen.
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|a World Scientific (Firm)
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|a World Scientific series in economic theory ;
|v v. 2.
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|u https://ezaccess.library.uitm.edu.my/login?url=http://www.worldscientific.com/worldscibooks/10.1142/8318#t=toc
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