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The Encyclopedia of Public Choice

The Encyclopedia provides a detailed and comprehensive account of the subject known as public choice. However, the title would not convey suf- ciently the breadth of the EncyclopediaỚ"s contents which can be summarized better as the fruitful interchange of economics, political science and mor...

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Bibliographic Details
Corporate Author: SpringerLink (Online service)
Other Authors: Rowley, Charles K. (Editor), Schneider, Friedrich. (Editor)
Format: Electronic
Language:English
Published: Boston, MA : Springer US, 2004.
Subjects:
Political science.
Economics.
Management science.
Public finance.
Economic policy.
Economics, general.
Public Economics.
Political Science.
Economic Policy.
Online Access:View fulltext via EzAccess
Table of Contents:
  • Essays
  • Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy
  • Public Choice: An Introduction
  • Are Vote and Popularity Functions Economically Correct?
  • Constitutional Political Economy
  • Corruption
  • Dictatorship
  • Environmental Politics
  • Experimental Public Choice
  • Gordon Tullock at Four Score Years: An Evaluation
  • Interest Group Behavior and Influence
  • International Trade Policy: Departure from Free Trade
  • James M. Buchanan
  • Milton Friedman, 1912: Harbinger of the Public Choice Revolution
  • Monetary Policy and Central Bank Behavior
  • The Political Economy of Taxation: Positive and Normative Analysis When Collective Choice Matters
  • Public Choice from the Perspective of Economics
  • Public Choice from the Perspective of the History of Thought
  • Public Choice Theory from the Perspective of Law
  • Public Choice from the Perspective of Philosophy
  • Public Choice from the Perspective of Sociology
  • Public Finance
  • Regulation and Antitrust
  • Scholarly Legacy of Mancur Olson
  • Shadow Economy
  • Social Choice, Contracts and Logrolling
  • Spatial Theory
  • Trade Liberalization and Globalization
  • William H. Riker
  • Concepts
  • Academia
  • Al-Qaeda
  • Alternative Voting Methods
  • Altruism
  • The Anatomy of Political Representation
  • Approval Voting
  • Arbitration and Bargaining
  • ArrowỚ"s Impossibility Theorem
  • An Ớ<U+00dc>AustrianỚ" Perspective on Public Choice
  • Autocracy
  • Autocratic Succession
  • Bicameralism
  • Blackmail
  • BlackỚ"s Single-Peakedness Condition
  • Budgetary Processes
  • Budget Deficits
  • Bureaucratic Discretion
  • Campaign Contributions and Campaign Finance
  • Campaign Finance 1
  • Campaign Finance 2
  • Central Banks
  • Chicago Political Economy
  • The Clayton Act
  • Coalitions and Power Indices
  • Coalitions and Social Choice
  • Coase Theorem and Political Markets
  • Coercion
  • Collective Action Under the Articles of Confederation
  • Committee Assignments
  • Committee Jurisdictions and PAC Contributions
  • Committees in Legislatures
  • Commons and Anticommons
  • Constitution
  • Constitutional Frameworks and Economic Progress
  • The Constitution of the European Union
  • Constitutional Political Economy
  • The Contemporary Political Economy Approach to Bureaucracy
  • Contractarianism
  • Corruption 1
  • Corruption 2
  • Cost and Choice
  • The Cost Disease of the Personal Services
  • Customary Law
  • The Demand-Revealing Process
  • Deregulation of Postal Service
  • Dictators and Social Contracts
  • Direct Democracy
  • Discrimination
  • Dynamic Inconsistency
  • Economic Freedom and its Measurement
  • Economic Freedom and Political Freedom
  • Economic Regulation
  • The Economic Theory of Clubs
  • Economists Versus the Public on Economic Policy
  • Education and the State
  • Efficiency of Democracy
  • Efficiency of Democracy?
  • The Efficiency of the Common Law Hypothesis
  • Elected Versus Appointed Regulators
  • Election Models
  • Electoral College
  • Electoral Competition in Mixed Systems of Representation
  • The Elusive Median Voter
  • Emerging from the Hobbesian Jungle
  • Endogenous Morality
  • Enron
  • Environmental Politics and Economic Development
  • The Euro
  • European Political Integration
  • Evolution of Institutions
  • The Evolution of Law
  • Experimental Economics and Public Choice
  • Experimental Public Choice
  • Expressive Voting and Redistribution
  • Fair Division
  • Fame and Politics
  • Federal Reserve System
  • Forecasting Presidential Elections in the United States
  • Game Theory
  • Game Theory in Public Choice
  • Generality and the Efficiency of Government Decision Making
  • Group Roles in Evolution and Cognition
  • Growth of Local Government in the United States
  • The Growth of Public Expenditure
  • The Growth of the Relative Size of Government
  • Heresthetics and the Evolution of the Us Constitution
  • Homo Economicus
  • Human Evolution and Political Behavior
  • Ideology
  • The Importance of the Middle in Spatial Politics
  • Initiative and Referendum
  • Institutions of Trade Protection
  • Interest Groups 1
  • Interest Groups 2
  • International Game of Power
  • International Organization
  • Internet Voting
  • Is Russia a Market Economy?
  • Is Voting Rational?
  • The Italian Public Finance Contribution to Public Choice
  • The Judiciary
  • The Law and Economics Movement
  • Legal Precedents and Judicial Discretion
  • Legal Rules and Standards
  • Legislative Politics
  • Legislators
  • Leviathan Models of Government
  • Logic of Collective Action
  • The Logic of Liberty
  • Logrolling 1
  • Logrolling 2
  • Meddlesome Preferences and Rent Extraction: The Tobacco Shakedown
  • The Median in Politics
  • The Median Voter Model
  • Medieval Church
  • Mercantilism
  • Monetary Politics
  • The New Deal
  • Nonprofit Organizations
  • The Origins of Social Choice Theory
  • The Paradox of Rebellion
  • Parchment Versus Guns
  • Political and Cultural Nationalism
  • Political Business Cycles
  • Political Economics and Public Choice
  • The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster Payments
  • The Political Economy of Italian Electoral Reform
  • Political Transaction-Cost Manipulation
  • Pressure Groups and Uninformed Voters
  • Principal-Agent Relationships in the Theory of Bureaucracy
  • Prohibition
  • Public Choice and Socialism
  • Public Choice and the Chicago School of Antitrust
  • Public Choice in Italy
  • Public Enterprise
  • Public Finance and the Median Voter Model
  • Public Finance in Democratic Process
  • Public Goods
  • Public Schools
  • Public Utility Regulation
  • Rational Choice Approaches to Economic and Political History
  • Rational Ignorance
  • Rational Irrationality
  • Reciprocity
  • Redistributive Politics 1
  • Redistributive Politics 2
  • Regulating Government
  • Regulatory Takings
  • Rent Dissipation
  • Rent Extraction
  • Rent Seeking
  • Rent Seeking and Political Institutions
  • Rent-Seeking Games
  • Rent Seeking in Development
  • The Rule of Law
  • Rules Versus Standards
  • Self-Interest
  • Selfish Gene
  • September 11, 2001
  • Single-Peaked Preferences and Median Voter Theorems
  • The Social Cost of Rent Seeking
  • Sortition
  • Standard Oil and Microsoft: Antitrust Lessons
  • State-Sponsored Murder as a Rent-Seeking Activity
  • Structure-Induced Equilibrium
  • Supply of Public Goods
  • The Supreme Court
  • Takings and Public Choice: The Persuasion of Price
  • Term Limits 1
  • Term Limits 2
  • Terrorism
  • The Theory and Measurement of Economic Freedom
  • Totalitarianism
  • Trade Protectionism
  • Transitional Economies
  • Transitions from Autocracy to Democracy
  • Triangulation
  • Underground Government: The Off-Budget Public Sector
  • The Value of Voting Rights
  • Votes for Women
  • Voting Equipment, Minorities and the Poor
  • Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections
  • Voting Paradoxes in List Systems of Proportional Representation
  • The War on Drugs
  • Welfare Economics and Public Choice
  • Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State
  • Why Government Succeeds.

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