Credible Threats in Negotiations A Game-theoretic Approach /

• Main Authors: Houba, Harold. (Author), Bolt, Wilko. (Author)
• Corporate Author: SpringerLink (Online service)
• Format: Electronic
• Language: English
• Published: Boston, MA : Springer US, 2002.
• Series: Theory and Decision Library, Series C: Game Theory, Mathematical Programming and Operations Research, 32
• Subjects: Economic theory.; Microeconomics.; Macroeconomics.; Labor economics.; Environmental economics.; Economics.; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods.; Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics.; Labor Economics.; Environmental Economics.
• Online Access: View fulltext via EzAccess

The game-theoretic modelling of negotiations has been an active research area for the past five decades, that started with the seminal work by Nobel laureate John Nash in the early 1950s. This book provides a survey of some of the major developments in the field of strategic bargaining models with a...

Table of Contents:

• The Essence of Negotiation
• Exogenous disagreement outcomes
• The Alternating Offers Procedure
• The Nash Program
• Comprehensive Bargaining Problems
• Comparative Statics
• A Bargaining Model with Threats
• Endogenous Threats
• Commitment and Endogenous Threats
• Bargaining over Wages
• The Policy Bargaining Model
• Destructive Threats.