Groups, Rules and Legal Practice

Ever since Hartþs The Concept of Law, legal philosophers agree that the practice of law-applying officials is a fundamental aspect of law. Yet there is a huge disagreement on the nature of this practice. Is it a conventional practice? Is it like the practice that takes place, more generally, when th...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Sǹchez Brigido, Rodrigo Eduardo. (Author)
Corporate Author: SpringerLink (Online service)
Format: Electronic
Language:English
Published: Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2010.
Series:Law and Philosophy Library, 89
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ezaccess.library.uitm.edu.my/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8770-6
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